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I. INTRODUCTION 
 The function of the judicial branch is ever-increasing in many 
countries and most particularly the United States.1  The central role 
of courts in the United States demands a regular review of the 
theories that underlie their operation to ensure that the reality 
approximates the theory.  With respect to its law-making function, 
 
       †   Thomas Tinkham is a Visiting Professor of Law at William Mitchell 
College of Law and of Counsel with Dorsey & Whitney, LLP. 
 1. Shimon Shetreet, Judicial Independence: New Conceptual Dimensions and 
Contemporary Challenges, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE 
590, 593–94 (Shimon Shetreet & Jules Deschenes eds., 1985). 
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the United States judicial branch of government is more prominent 
than any other in the world.2  As the role of the courts increases, 
public scrutiny has also increased, and rightfully so.3  In a 
democratic society, judicial independence should be balanced with 
judicial accountability.4  This article concludes that there is a 
rational basis to believe that a number of policies, such as release of 
judicial data and judicial evaluations, would enhance judicial 
accountability without impacting judicial independence.  In 
addition, judicial elections could be improved by providing 
relevant data on judicial performance and opinions of candidates 
on relevant issues. 
While the role of courts in our society has at times been 
marked by restraint, it has also been prominently activist, 
alternatively on the liberal and then on the conservative side.  On 
the one hand, restraint is reflected in the fact that, as of May 2000, 
only 158 of the many thousands of federal laws have been declared 
(at least in part) unconstitutional.5  On the other hand, the pace of 
such declarations has increased.  Moreover, the number of 
decisions interpreting or reinterpreting the United States 
Constitution has remarkably increased in the last fifty years.6  
Whether it is the rights of criminal defendants, abortion, freedom 
of speech, or school desegregation, courts have impacted and 
changed most aspects of contemporary society.7  A review of any 
major newspaper demonstrates the prominence of courts in our 
society.  Whether the subject is the prosecution of a highly visible 
defendant for securities fraud or a civil suit for a mass oil spill, the 
courts have become more visible in the news than the legislative 
branch and at times even more visible than the executive branch.  
  
 
 2. Id. at 603–04; Peter H. Russell, Judicial Independence in Comparative 
Perspective, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN THE AGE OF DEMOCRACY 301, 302 (Peter H. 
Russell & David M. O’Brian eds., 2001). 
 3. Russell, supra note 2, at 307; Paul D. Carrington & Roger A. Cramton, 
Original Sin and Judicial Independence: Providing Accountability for Justices, 50 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1105, 1107 (2009). 
 4. Carrington & Cramton, supra note 3, at 1109. 
 5. Henry J. Abraham, The Pillars and Politics of Judicial Independence in the 
United States, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN THE AGE OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 2, at 
25, 31. 
 6. Archibald Cox, The Independence of the Judiciary: History and Purposes, 21 U. 
DAYTON L. REV. 565, 580–83 (1996) (discussing changes in judicial law-making 
during the Warren and Burger courts). 
 7. Id. at 580–81. 
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There can be no doubt that as the courts increase their 
prominence and influence they attract more critical commentary 
and increased effort to influence their decisions.8  With 
independence, judges may exercise appropriate discretion to 
determine the issues before them.  Such independence allows 
judges to review actions of the legislative and executive branches of 
government as equal or even superior participants in government.  
Decisional independence allows judges to decide the individual 
matters before them free from the dictates of a legislature, an 
executive, the public, or the parties’ extra-judicial influences.  With 
judges less responsive to the democratic will, it is striking that 
American judicial prominence has been achieved in a society that 
prides itself, perhaps above all others, on adherence to democratic 
principles. 
Most judges are first appointed to their positions.  Once in 
their judicial positions, those who are subject to election are rarely 
defeated.9  Judicially created rules of conduct shield judges from ex 
parte influences so that any public influence on particular case 
decisions is limited.  The goal of this independence is to provide 
neutral judicial decisions removed from political or public 
influence.10  However, as independence increases, the impact of 
public opinion, as expressed by elected officials or the public 
directly, wanes.  Judicial decisions can be made by an elite group of 
judges not subject to public review.  Some commentators suggest 
that the answer to the potential of absolute judicial independence 
lies in judicial accountability.11  Judges must be accountable for 
judicial restraint, impartiality, and observance of society’s needs. 
 
 
 8. Abraham, supra note 5, at 33.  
 9. CHRIS W. BONNEAU & MELINDA GAM HALL, IN DEFENSE OF JUDICIAL 
ELECTIONS 9 (2009). 
 10. Martin H. Redish, Federal Judicial Independence: Constitutional and Political 
Perspectives, 46 MERCER L. REV. 697, 707 (1995). But see Cox, supra note 6, at 567. 
Cox broadens the scope of judicial independence to include protection against 
executive oppression and protection for fundamental human rights.  Id. at 567–71.  
The first relates to institutional independence, while both relate to a political 
position rather than a guarantee of decisional neutrality.  Id. at 567–74. 
 11. Cox, supra note 6¸ at 567 (“The court must preserve its legitimacy and the 
ideal of law by invoking a majestic sense of continuity.  At the same time, the law 
must coincide with the dominant needs and aspirations of its times.  The dilemma 
is insoluble.  By careful attention to the discipline of legal reasoning, a great judge 
can minimize the danger of writing personal values or preferences into decisions 
while also demonstrating that the new law, which the court must make from time 
to time, is linked to an inherited tradition.”). 
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In a democracy, however, accountability of public officials is 
ultimately to the electorate. If accountability is the restraint on 
judicial excess, how do we measure and then enforce that 
accountability?12  This article is an attempt to move toward a 
rational approach to judicial independence so that there are some 
mechanisms to measure and enforce accountability.  First, I briefly 
review the history and purpose of judicial independence to 
demonstrate that there are appropriate limits.  Second, the article 
explores the major democratic principles generally accepted by our 
society that conflict with the unfettered application of judicial 
independence.  Finally, it explores some of the possible 
mechanisms for judicial accountability to determine whether they 
actually conflict with independence or neutral decision-making.  
This approach allows us to focus on some of the current aspects of 
our judicial system, often defended in the name of judicial 
independence, that impinge on democratic decision-making.  The 
analysis, however, moves us toward a greater consensus because the 
twin goals of independent decision-making and democratic 
decision-making conflict on many, but not all, points.  How we 
draw the appropriate lines will depend on the extent to which we 
value democratic versus neutral decisions.13  Looked at from 
another perspective, our boundaries for the degree of judicial 
independence will depend on our comfort with decisions made by 
a benevolent elite versus representatives highly responsive to the 
public will.  Nevertheless, the analysis is useful because it allows us 
to isolate elements of the present judicial system that do not 
further the important interest of judicial independence.  The 
analysis can bring into sharper focus the competing goal of 
democratic accountability allowing us to make more rational 




 12. See Shetreet, supra note 1, at 655 (discussing worldwide trends towards 
subjecting judges to greater scrutiny to improve judicial performance). 
 13. C. NEAL TATE & TORBJORN VALLINDS, THE GLOBAL EXPANSION OF JUDICIAL 
POWERS 2 (1955); Brandice Canes-Wrone & Tom S. Clark, Judicial Independence and 
Nonpartisan Elections, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 21, 23 (2009). 
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II. THE NATURE AND HISTORY OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 
PERMITS SOME REASONABLE CONCLUSIONS ON 
COMPETING GOALS 
The goals of judicial independence are both lofty and 
practically significant.  At an institutional level we seek judicial 
independence so that the judicial branch can act as a check on the 
potential excesses of the legislative and executive branches of 
government.14  We balance that goal with the expectation that the 
executive and legislative functions will be able to curb excesses that 
may develop in the judicial system.  At a decisional level, we 
promote judicial independence to achieve the goal of neutrality 
and fairness in individual case decisions.15  We seek not only 
neutrality in fact but the perception of neutrality so that the public 
can have confidence in our judicial system.  At the same time we 
recognize that individual cases ultimately establish social and 
economic policy so that neutral decision-making must be 
responsive to the needs and desires of the society.16  In a democracy 
we believe the citizens should make important decisions through 
elected representatives who should be accountable to citizens for 
their decisions.17  There is an expectation that judges will be 
accountable for their performance while making neutral 
decisions.18  It is these potentially conflicting, laudable goals of 
independence and accountability that create the continued need to 
evaluate whether our judicial system is achieving the appropriate 
balance.19 
This article focuses on the decisional aspects of judicial 
independence rather than the institutional aspects.  However, to 
clearly appreciate the policy factors that apply to decisional 
independence, it is necessary to review the interplay between 
institutional and decisional independence.  Institutional 
independence allows judges to be free from undue influence by the 
 
 14. Charles Gardner Geyh & Emily Field Van Tassel, The Independence of the 
Judicial Branch in the New Republic, 74 CHI.-KENT. L. REV 31, 32 (1998). 
 15. Id.; Peter H. Russell, Toward a General Theory of Judicial Independence, in 
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN THE AGE OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 2, at 1, 10. 
 16. Abraham, supra note 5, at 34. 
 17. Mauro Cappelletti, Who Watches the Watchmen? A Comparative Study on 
Judicial Responsibility, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE, supra 
note 1, at 550, 557. 
 18. Id. at 550. 
 19. See Shetreet, supra note 1, at 635–36. 
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executive, legislative, and even elements of the judiciary.20  
Decisional independence allows the judge to decide cases on a 
neutral and impartial basis free from undue influence by anyone, 
including the litigants, the executive, the legislative, and even, 
arguably, the public. 
Independence from the executive branch of government 
requires that to a large extent judges not be dependent for their 
jobs, pay, and conditions of employment on the executive.21  To the 
extent the executive can reverse decisions of the judiciary, effective 
independence is threatened.  If a judge is subject to removal by the 
executive on account of decisions, independence is impaired.  
Decisions by the executive about judicial pay or benefits will have a 
restraining impact on judicial independence.  When we consider 
alternatives for judicial appointments, retention, and 
compensation, the choices allow the public, the executive, the 
legislature, or the judiciary to exert influence over the 
independence of the individual judge.22  Any system will allow some 
influence—the real question is the source and amount of influence 
permitted by the system. 
Independence from the legislative branch of government can 
be negatively impacted where a judge’s appointment, tenure, and 
pay are subject to legislative determination.23  Where the legislature 
controls the key elements that impact judicial performance, judicial 
independence will weaken.  Independence from judicial system 
influence can be viewed as both an institutional and decisional 
aspect of judicial independence.  Where judicial officers can 
determine the selection, tenure, and pay of the judges in the 
system, we can reasonably expect the judiciary to be able to present 
a stronger and even monolithic front to the other government 
branches and the public.  On the other hand, judicial system 
control of the individual judge will negatively impact neutrality in 
individual decisions.24  If, because of control by superior judges, an 
 
 20. See ABA COMM. ON SEPARATION OF POWERS & JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, AN 
INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY 5–6 (1997), available at http://www.abanet.org/poladv
/documents/indepenjud.pdf [hereinafter ABA INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY]. 
 21. See id. at 12–13 (explaining that federal judges were given a life tenure 
and a salary that could not be diminished to support their independence from the 
executive and legislative branches). 
 22. BONNEAU & HALL, supra note 9, at 9; Russell, supra note 15, at 16. 
 23. See Russell, supra note 15, at 25–28. 
 24. See David M. O’Brian & Yasuo Ohkoshi, Stifling Judicial Independence from 
Within, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN THE AGE OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 2, at 37, 59; 
Shetreet, supra note 1, at 591. 
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individual judge must decide each case in a prescribed manner, we 
will have achieved uniformity at the expense of neutrality.  Where 
appellate review is unlimited and superior judges determine 
judicial assignments and initial or continuing appointment, 
uniformity of approach and cohesiveness are promoted over the 
goal of decisional independence.25 
Focusing on decisional independence, restrictions on the 
ability of the public to influence the courts will allow greater 
independence at the expense of judicial accountability and 
democratic control of decision-making.  Likewise, restrictions on 
the ability of litigants to exercise extra-judicial influence over 
judicial decisions may enhance neutrality at the expense of 
freedom of speech.  The absence of control over appointments, 
removals, reappointments, or pay by the executive, legislature, or 
judiciary itself will promote the goal of judicial independence.  On 
the other hand, the absence of any control allows decisions to be 
made at the absolute whim of each individual judge. The individual 
judge is then subject to no controls other than his or her own sense 
of responsibility and fairness.  The democratic control by citizens 
over judicial officials is absent. 
To further understand the interplay of competing goals, it is 
necessary to appreciate the primary factors that can influence each 
aspect of judicial independence.  The executive gains influence 
where it appoints judges, reappoints or removes judges, determines 
pay and benefits, funds the judicial system, and can effectively 
reverse its decisions.26  Similarly, the legislature asserts influence 
and reduces judicial influence where it controls appointment, 
retention, pay, funding, or can overrule judicial decisions.27  
Individual judges can be strongly influenced by the judicial system 
itself through a broad appellate process of appointment, removal, 
and assignment authority.28 
The extent to which any individual judge may need various 
protections to assure independence and neutrality will vary.  Some 
judges are more easily influenced than others.  At the one extreme 
are those who will provide neutral and fair decisions without any 
 
 25. See O’Brian & Ohkoshi, supra note 24, at 37, 59. 
 26. See Leonard King, The IBA Standards of Judicial Independence: An Australian 
Prospective, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE, supra note 1, at 
403, 405–12. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Shetreet, supra note 1, at 637–43; see Russell, supra note 2, at 304. 
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protections.29  On the other hand, some will be subject to effective 
influence even with lifetime appointments and guaranteed salaries.  
We should not design our systems for either extreme.  We can 
expect that most judges should be relatively able to adhere to the 
accepted goal of fair and neutral decisions.  Our systems should be 
designed for this great majority.  We need not design a system with 
every conceivable protection when there are negative impacts from 
each limitation aimed at enhancing judicial independence. 
The history of choices among alternatives in the United States 
reflects our own particular history, the interest in achieving a 
balance between competing branches of government, and 
decisions about competing policy goals.  The provisions that 
created the judiciary in Article III of the United States Constitution 
are a reflection of the negative reaction to the King’s appointment 
and removal of judges to maintain the Crown’s policies.30  The 
Declaration of Independence complains of the operation of the 
colonial courts at the whim of the King.31  Article III of the United 
States Constitution assigned the judicial function to the courts.32  
Judges are appointed for life.33  Their pay cannot be reduced 
during their tenure.34  Removal is only by legislative impeachment.35  
On the other hand, the organization of the courts is left to the 
Congress, which may also determine the jurisdiction of courts of 
the United States.36  The courts have no independent means of 
enforcing their orders and must ultimately rely on the executive 
branch for that purpose.37  While appointment authority was jointly 
vested in the legislative and executive branches, it does not appear 
that serious thought was given at the creation of the Constitution as 
to whether courts should be independent from the people.38  Over 
the intervening years we have seen removal by impeachment rarely 
used and, while occasionally threatened based upon the apparent 
merit of a particular judicial decision, never actually used in this 
 
 29. Russell, supra note 15, at 6–7. 
 30. Shetreet, supra note 1, at 603; Manfred Simon, The Role of Judges in a 
Rapidly Changing Society, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE, 
supra note 1, at 546, 556; Cox, supra note 6, at 570.  
 31. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 11 (U.S. 1776). 
 32. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 33. Abraham, supra note 5, at 26. 
 34. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 35. Id.; see also Abraham, supra note 5, at 26. 
 36. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 37. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. 
 38. Geyh & Van Tassel, supra note 14, at 36. 
8
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way.39  Courts of the United States have developed a complex 
appellate review system that promotes uniformity of law but 
generally allows individual judges discretion on fact-finding in 
individual cases.40  Similarly, a complex judicial administrative 
system has developed that may impact assignments of particular 
judges.41 
The pattern with state courts and independence is more 
complex.  Initially some state constitutions provided that judges 
were appointed and retained by executive or administrative 
agencies.42  In the 1830s dissatisfaction developed with this method 
and more states provided for either initial election or retention 
elections after limited appointed terms.43  Generally, state court 
budgets and the jurisdiction of state courts is determined by the 
legislature.  Most often, initial appointments of judges are 
determined by the governor with the advice of a selection 
commission.44  Over the last thirty years there has been some 
negative reaction to elections with fewer states providing for 
partisan elections and some states moving to retention elections.45  
All state court systems have complex appellate review rules to 
facilitate uniformity of law.46  They also often have administrative 
systems that allow for assignment of judges by superior judicial 
officers.  Through codes of judicial conduct, state courts limit the 
extrajudicial influence of litigants and the public on individual 
decisions.47  The history of federal and state court creation does not 
provide clear answers to today’s issues of judicial independence 
and accountability because contemporary issues were not 
significant or were given little attention during constitutional 
conventions.48   
 
 
 39. Abraham, supra note 5, at 26. 
 40. FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6); RICHARD D. FREER, CIVIL PROCEDURE, 805–10 (2d 
ed. 2009). 
 41. See Shetreet, supra note 1, at 644–45. 
 42. Robert B. McKay & James M. Parkison, United States of America, in JUDICIAL 
INDEPENDENCE: THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE, supra note 1, at 358, 360. 
 43. BONNEAU & HALL, supra note 9, at 5–9; Shetreet, supra note 1, at 603. 
 44. Shetreet, supra note 1, at 603. 
 45. BONNEAU & HALL, supra note 9, at 3. 
 46. See generally MINN. R. CIV. APP. P. (illustrating the complexities of rules 
directed toward appellate review). 
 47. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT  R. 1.3, 2.4, 3.1, 3.3, 4.1, 4.2, 
4.4 (2008). 
 48. Geyh & Van Tassel, supra note 14, at 40–56. 
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There are significant countervailing goals negatively impacted 
by some policies that promote judicial independence.  On an 
institutional level, a strong judiciary may remove important public 
policy decisions from the elected representatives of the citizens and 
provoke criticism.49  Where judges, independent of citizen control, 
make decisions on reproductive rights, rights of criminal 
defendants, or desegregation, the democratic process is 
significantly impacted.50  Where citizens are unable to effectively 
voice a position on important issues coming before the courts, 
democratic ideals are challenged, and freedom of speech and the 
right to petition the government suffers.  Where judges shield their 
performance from public view, the democratic ideal of public 
officials’ accountability is challenged. 
This brief overview of the history and the elements impacting 
judicial independence allows a number of reasonable conclusions 
that should influence the current debates over judicial 
independence.  First, in both theory and practice, judicial 
independence, whether institutional or decisional, has never been 
treated as an absolute.51  Those who argue that judicial 
independence demands a certain result, without consideration of 
the competing interests, are wrong on both a theoretical and 
practical level.  The issue of judicial independence requires a 
weighing of competing interests rather than single-minded 
obedience to a particular talisman.52  Second, judicial 
independence is not an end in itself.53  The actual goal is neutral 
 
 49. See, e.g., ABA INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY, supra note 20, at vi (presenting a 
critique of the Supreme Court’s handling of line item veto legislation passed in 
1997). 
 50. See Shetreet, supra note 1, at 656. 
 51. See Russell, supra note 15, at 12; see also World Conference on the 
Independence of Justice, Universal Declaration on the Independence of Justice, in 
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE, supra note 1, at 447, 448–50 
[hereinafter World Conference].  But see THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, THE 
NEWSROOM GUIDE TO JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 3 (2006), available at 
http://www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/37.pdf (“We believe judicial 
independence can only be achieved when judges have the freedom to make 
decisions according to the law, without regard to political or public pressure, 
which allows them to protect the basic rights to individuals and decide cases 
fairly.”). 
 52. See Cappelletti, supra note 17, at 555–57; Shetreet, supra note 1, at 635–36. 
 53. Cappelletti, supra note 17, at 556 (“Judicial independence (from the 
executive) is itself anything but an ultimate value; far from being an end in itself . . 
. .”); Russell, supra note 2, at 301, 303 (discussing other countries’ approaches to 
the problem of judicial independence and accountability). 
10
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decision-making.54  In considering any of the policies or programs 
that may relate to judicial independence, the most pertinent 
question is the impact on neutral decision-making.  Third, as a 
corollary to this last point, the doctrine of judicial independence is 
for the benefit of the public and not for the benefit of judges.55  
Arguments that a particular policy will make the judicial function 
more difficult for judges and thus undercut judicial independence 
are not rationally related to the ultimate goal of neutral decisions. 
Fourth, the tools or policies to promote neutral decision-
making are of different strengths, and the impact of different tools 
or policies on the competing goals vary considerably.  For example, 
lifetime appointments do more to insulate a judge from both 
individual case and institutional pressure than any other device.56  
At the same time, lifetime appointments remove most aspects of 
democratic accountability and permit significant discretion 
unencumbered by a need to follow the popular will.57  Finally, there 
is no way to measure the actual effect of many of the elements of 
judicial independence on the ultimate goal of neutral decision-
making.  We do not necessarily agree on what is a neutral decision, 
and the many variables impacting any judicial decision make 
measurement of neutrality impossible.  Similarly, it is impossible to 
determine the negative impact of many of these policies on 
accountability or democratic decision-making.  Logic will often tell 
us the probable impact of a policy, but it will give us little 
information of its magnitude.  This doesn’t mean we can avoid 
making judgments because in this area not making a judgment is to 
make a judgment.  The status quo is not stationary.  Both new laws 
and court decisions continually modify the authority and 
independence of judges.  We should all recognize, however, that 
dogmatic certainty on this subject is inappropriate.  In many 
aspects of this issue, neither history nor data provides clear answers. 
 
 54. See World Conference, supra note 51, at 12. 
 55. See Cappelletti, supra note 17, at 556. 
 56. See World Conference, supra note 51, at 14.  See generally Carrington & 
Cramton, supra note 3, at 1108 (outlining the historical progression of managing 
judicial independence). 
 57. See generally Russell, supra note 15, at 5 (citing perspectives of various 
authors regarding the independence of judges and lawyers). 
11
Tinkham: Applying a Rational Approach to Judicial Independence and Account
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2011
  
1644 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:3 
III. AN APPLICATION OF GENERALLY ACCEPTED 
PROPOSITIONS TO SEVERAL CONTEMPORARY ISSUES 
ALLOWS REASONABLE CONCLUSIONS 
Having recognized the difficulty of making absolute judgments 
in this area, the five relatively uncontroversial points outlined above 
provide a basis for reasonable conclusions on some practices 
associated with judicial independence or neutral decision-making.  
First, consider some of the practices impacting individual litigants.  
The judicial codes and the rules of professional responsibility 
prohibit litigants and judges from having ex parte communications 
regarding the merits of cases before them.58  These rules serve an 
important function in preserving neutral decision-making.  The 
judge hears from the parties on all pertinent issues in the presence 
of all parties.  The litigants can believe the judge is neutral and not 
subject to “influence” outside their presence.  The rules do restrict 
freedom of speech and the right to petition, but the restriction is 
limited and reasonable.  Other court rules guarantee the parties 
the opportunity to provide the court with all pertinent information 
and argument as long as those arguments are made available to all 
parties.59 
Judges enjoy absolute immunity from damage suits for any 
action taken even arguably within their jurisdiction.60  Clearly, this 
serves an important purpose in allowing judges to make fair and 
neutral decisions.  If a judge is worried about one party or another 
bringing suit, it may impact the judge’s decision.  Certainly the 
threat of suit would create the perception that a judge could be 
influenced by the possibility of litigation and expense from suit.  
This immunity doctrine, however, runs counter to the notion of 
accountability.61  Some persons harmed by a judicial action will be 
without a remedy.  Judicial immunity is broader than the qualified 
 
 58. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Cannon 2.9 (2008); MODEL RULES OF 
PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY Cannon 7, DR 7-110(B) (2008). 
 59. E.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 5(a)(1), 43(a). 
 60. See, e.g., Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 357 (1978) (stating that a 
defendant judge is only subject to liability “in the clear absence of any 
jurisdiction”).  The facts of this case are particularly egregious.  A 15-year-old was 
ordered to undergo a tubal ligation without prior notice or a subsequent 
opportunity to appeal.  In fact, she wasn’t told the nature of the medical 
procedure until long after the fact.  Id. at 351.  See also Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 
335, 336 (1871). 
 61. Cappelletti, supra note 17, at 554–56. 
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immunity provided to most members of the executive branch.62  
Unfortunately, the doctrine is for the most part created by judges 
for the benefit of judges.  While no man should be the judge of his 
own case, this particular doctrine is appropriate.63  The harm to the 
decision-making process by suits against judges would be great.  
The time spent responding to such suits would interfere with 
performance of judicial duties.  The negative impact on 
accountability is minimized by several well-established rules of 
judicial procedure.  First, the appellate procedures that are nearly 
always available in our courts provide recourse for misapplication 
of the law and arbitrary conduct by lower courts.  Second, the 
opportunity for adversarial presentation of facts and arguments 
most often prevents the worst excesses that can come from a purely 
one-sided presentation.  While it is true that a few people are 
harmed by judicial immunity, and it is difficult to know how many, 
the relatively few reported cases or press accounts suggest the 
number is few.  If we were to modify the rule to only provide 
qualified immunity to judges, we could expect regular suits, like we 
see against executive branch employees, testing whether the judge 
acted just negligently or in deliberate disregard of the law.64  The 
harm from such suits would outweigh the damage that may be 
done in the very few cases that might ultimately survive a qualified 
immunity standard.65 
Financial relationships between judges and litigants present a 
more complicated factual picture but one that requires more 
stringent rules than we have at present.  In federal courts, rules 
require litigants to disclose significant corporate ownership.66  
Federal judges disqualify themselves when they have a financial 
interest in a party that “could be substantially affected” by the 
matter.67  State court judges may also have investments in 
corporations that come before them. Many state court judges 
receive campaign contributions from attorneys, litigants, and 
potential litigants.  The ABA Model Code of Conduct provides that 
 
 62. See Frank Way, A Call for Limits to Judicial Immunity: Must Judges be Kings in 
Their Courts?, 64 JUDICATURE 390, 396 (1981) (arguing for limits on judicial 
immunity). 
 63. Id.  
 64. See generally Pullian v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 551–53 (1984) (discussing some 
of the limits of judicial immunity). 
 65. See Stump, 435 U.S. at 363–64; Bradley, 80 U.S. at 354. 
 66. FED. R. CIV. P. 7.01. 
 67. 28 U.S.C. §§ 455(b)(4)–(5) (2006). 
13
Tinkham: Applying a Rational Approach to Judicial Independence and Account
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2011
  
1646 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:3 
a judge should self-disqualify when he or she has an economic 
interest in a party that is more than de minimis and may be 
affected by the outcome.68  The model code also suggests that 
judges be disqualified when the judge knows a party or a party’s 
lawyer has made a recent campaign contribution.69  No trigger 
amount is suggested in this model rule.  These proposed rules are 
not sufficiently clear and the campaign contribution provision has 
not been generally adopted by the states.70  The United States 
Supreme Court recently held that where an owner of a corporation 
made contributions of over three million dollars to a state supreme 
court justice’s campaign, due process required the justice recuse 
himself.71  The decision notes that states are free to adopt more 
restrictive measures.72 
We all appreciate that a financial interest provides a strong 
incentive that influences behavior.  Both the reality and 
appearance of neutral justice are adversely impacted where a judge 
has an economic interest in a party or has received any significant 
campaign contribution from a party or a party’s attorney.  It is 
inappropriate to ask judges to avoid any financial investments and 
we may not constitutionally prohibit campaign contributions by 
lawyers and potential parties.  However, we can require judges to 
recuse themselves when they or their immediate family have a 
financial interest in a party or they received more than a de 
minimis (say one hundred dollars) campaign contribution toward 
their last election campaign from a party, an attorney, or a single 
interest advocacy group appearing before them.  By requiring 
disqualification for any material economic interest, we can preserve 
the benefits of both judicial neutrality and freedom of speech in 
campaigns.  The seriousness of the impact on the reality and 
appearance of neutrality caused by a judge’s conflicting financial 
interests requires clear rules prohibiting these obvious conflicts.  
The minor difficulty of finding alternate judges when there is a 
recusal is not significant compared to the negative impact of 
 
 68.  MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2.11A(3) (2008). 
 69. Id. at Canon 2.11A(4). 
 70. See Bert Brandenburg, Inevitable, Flexible, Expandable Caperton?, 33 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 617, 624 (2010) (exploring the implications of Caperton v. 
Massey, 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009), which involved a Virginia Supreme Court justice 
who refused to recuse himself from a case despite receiving the majority of his 
election campaign funds from one of the litigants). 
 71. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2266–67 (2009).  
 72. Id.  
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allowing judges with economic interests to decide cases.  The 
inconvenience or annoyance to the judge in keeping track of 
economic conflicts does not approach the damage to the fact and 
appearance of neutrality caused by significant economic conflicts. 
Occasionally the claim is made that criticism by litigants or 
their attorneys impinges on judicial independence.73  We should 
reject this suggestion.  It is the essence of freedom of speech to be 
able to comment on the actions of government officials.74  The 
Model Code of Professional Conduct permits criticism of judicial 
conduct as long as it is not knowingly false or reckless regarding the 
integrity or qualifications of a judge.75  After a case is concluded, 
critical comment is highly unlikely to impact the outcome.  Judges 
should be open to criticism.76  Some criticism may serve to improve 
performance.  While some argue that judges should only be subject 
to “fair” criticism, the fact is we will not all agree on what is “fair.”77  
Rather than regulate criticism by its fairness, all discussion should 
be permitted and the public can sort out what is correct.  Even 
critical public comment during a proceeding by a party, while most 
likely ill-advised, should not be considered an improper intrusion 
on judicial independence.78  If the comment is seen or heard by the 
judge, it can be brought to the attention of all parties for 
appropriate response.  The adversary system can function 
effectively and freedom of speech is preserved.79 
There are a number of issues related to judicial independence 
that impact the public, beyond solely the litigants.  The resolution 
of some of these issues is also aided by a full understanding of the 
purposes of judicial independence and an analysis of the particular 
issue in light of competing goals.  Courts have available, or could 
have available, a myriad of statistics on judicial performance.  
Straightforward information on judicial workload and attendance is 
significant to an evaluation of judicial performance.  The number 
or percentage of appeals, affirmances, and reversals is relevant to 
 
 73. See ABA INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY, supra note 20 at 19–20. 
 74. See generally New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (noting 
the importance of providing safeguards for freedom of speech and freedom of the 
press in a defamation case brought by a public official against critics of his official 
conduct). 
 75. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 8-102(B) (2008). 
 76. See Shetreet, supra note 1, at 656. 
 77. See id.  
 78. See Russell, supra note 15, at 21–22. 
 79. See ABA INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY, supra note 20, at i, vi (noting that judicial 
independence should not be used to stifle criticism of judicial conduct). 
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an evaluation of a judge’s willingness and ability to follow the law.  
Recusals or party removals may provide useful information on a 
judge’s ability or fairness as perceived by litigating parties.  
Surprisingly, much of this information is often difficult to obtain.  
The argument for withholding this information is very weak.  The 
data may be subject to misinterpretation, as is most data, but the 
court or judge will have the opportunity to provide an accurate 
interpretation. 
On the other hand, this data is clearly relevant in assessing 
performance.  While the data may suggest a judge is doing a good 
or poor job, it is highly unlikely to bear on the merits of any future 
decision.  The data may be embarrassing to a particular judge, but 
the purpose of judicial independence is not served by avoiding 
embarrassment of particular judges.  To foster democratic 
accountability of judges, the public dissemination of performance 
data is critical.  Whether judges are appointed or elected, the 
public should have good information on the performance of 
important public officials.  The argument that the data may be 
misunderstood by the public is inconsistent with democratic 
principles.  The federal government and most states have “freedom 
of information” acts which grant citizen access to most executive 
data.80  There is a need for established mechanisms to disseminate 
information on judicial performance. 
Many of the same arguments relate to the more explosive issue 
of judicial evaluation.81  While some judges have been supportive of 
judicial evaluation, many have opposed these programs claiming 
they will interfere with judicial independence or will not be 
properly understood by the public.82  Evaluation programs have 
sought information from people with experience before the judge: 
parties, lawyers, or court personnel.  The best evaluation programs 
ask about the judge’s work habits, knowledge of the law, treatment 
of litigants, and perceived fairness.  Most professionals, including 
doctors and lawyers, are constantly evaluated.  Judges should accept 
 
 80. E.g., Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006); MINN. STAT. §§ 
13.01–13.90 (2008). 
 81. See David C. Brody, The Use of Judicial Performance Evaluation to Enhance 
Judicial Accountability, Judicial Independence, and Public Trust, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 
115, 155–56 (2008) (summarizing the importance of judicial performance 
evaluations). 
 82. See Russell, supra note 15, at 19; Richard B. Hoffman & Frank P. Cihlar, 
Judicial Independence: Can It Be Without Article III?, 46 MERCER L. REV. 863, 879–80 
(1995) (discussing the history and impacts of judicial performance evaluation). 
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evaluation programs as a reasonable aspect of judicial 
accountability.  There is no better method available to provide the 
public with information on judicial performance.  The impact of 
public access to this information will reward some judges by 
highlighting their superior performance.  Others may feel 
threatened for fear of a poor evaluation or embarrassed by the 
public release of bad marks.  However, there is no rational basis to 
suggest good or bad evaluation results will impact the merits of a 
subsequent decision.83  The results may cause the judge to reflect 
on his or her diligence, fairness, and preparation, but that is for the 
public good.  Democratic accountability is promoted by the 
availability of evaluation data on judicial performance.84  There is 
no reasonable basis to argue that public evaluation will significantly 
impact neutral decision-making. 
Where judges are elected, performance data, such as 
evaluation results, is critical to an informed electorate.85  Some 
judges and lawyers complain that voters are uninformed in judicial 
elections.86  It is the courts and lawyers who fail to provide pertinent 
data that would inform the public.  As lawyers and judges, we have 
the means to provide the data on which the public could make 
more meaningful choices in judicial elections. 
A judge with good evaluations is unlikely to be opposed in the 
next election, while one with poor evaluations is more likely to be 
opposed.  The judge drawing an opponent may be inconvenienced, 
but the process promotes public accountability and a meaningful 
democratic election process.  Where judges are selected for life, as 
in the federal system, meaningful public evaluation is totally absent, 
but very necessary.  A lifetime judicial appointment is clearly the 
most powerful available tool promoting judicial independence.87  At 
the same time, it has a negative impact on the goals of 
accountability and democratic responsiveness.  Beyond appeals, an 
 
 83. See Russell, supra note 15, at 19 (discussing the use of public complaints, 
reprimands, and “sensitivity training” as part of an evaluative process, but noting 
that judicial independence can be retained throughout such procedures). 
 84. See id. 
 85. William R. Anderson, Judicial Selection in Washington–Taking Elections 
Seriously, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 605, 612 (2010) (discussing the need for inclusion 
of performance and other data to empower a meaningful election process for 
judges); Brody, supra note 81, at 118. 
 86. See BONNEAU & HALL, supra note 9, at 2. 
 87. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton); cf. Carrington & 
Cramton, supra note 3, at 1108–09 (discussing the use of removal and disciplinary 
proceedings to enhance accountability). 
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occasional media story, or a litigant’s comments, there are few 
restraints—other than self-restraint—on the discretion and 
behavior of those with lifetime appointments.88  Public judicial 
evaluation of judges with lifetime appointments will have little 
impact on the merits of decisions by someone so insulated from 
negative consequences.  It can advance the goals of democratic 
accountability by providing some public consequences for the best 
or worst judicial behavior.  It can also provide encouragement for 
more positive judicial behavior. 
The increasing presence of citizen advocacy groups in our 
courtrooms has led to negative comments from some judges.  
These groups range from better government coalitions to groups 
stridently advocating particular case outcomes.  Whether it is the 
League of Women Voters or Mothers Against Drunk Driving 
(MADD), these groups operate on well-traveled roads protected by 
First Amendment rights of freedom of speech and petition.  Those 
critical of organized public advocacy argue that the presence of 
these groups in the courtroom and their public comments will 
influence the judge and thus impact judicial neutrality.  This 
situation brings into sharper focus competing goals because the 
very purpose of the group activity may be to influence judicial 
action.  These groups are often seeking to impact both the manner 
of judicial performance and the case outcome.  But consider the 
importance of the competing values and the actual impact of the 
activity on those values.  These First Amendment rights are among 
our most cherished.  What does it say about our judicial system if 
we forbid citizens to have a voice that can be heard?  The impact 
on judicial neutrality from accepting these groups in our 
courtrooms is not nearly as severe as barring constitutionally 
protected conduct.  Comment from these groups is very public and 
the litigants have a full opportunity to respond to it.   
Finally, these citizens groups do not have a strong negative 
impact on judicial neutrality.  First, many of these groups focus on 
the quality of performance rather than the outcome, so there is 
little impact from their activities on the merits of the decision.89  
 
 88. See Gordon Bermant & Russell R. Wheeler, Federal Judges and the Judicial 
Branch: Their Independence and Accountability, 46 MERCER L. REV. 835, 843 n.33 
(1995) (showing the effects of the Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct 
and Disability Act of 1980 on judicial independence; suggesting that there are 
little or no repercussions, in most cases, upon the filing of a judicial complaint). 
 89. See, e.g., League of Women Voters, About the League, http://www.lwv.org
/AM/Template.cfm?Section=About_Us (last visited Jan. 20, 2011) (explaining that 
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Second, other groups focus on relatively broad but important 
societal issues—e.g., the incarceration rate for drunk drivers, the 
allowance of abortion, or the treatment of victims or perpetrators 
of domestic violence.90  Simply by deciding cases, any judge whose 
responsibility includes these matters will have a developed view of 
the appropriate policy, and the judge will apply that view to the 
individual facts of the next case.  The petitioning group often seeks 
to change that judicial view and have the judge adopt a different 
policy.  In this regard, the judge is no more neutral at the policy 
level than is the petitioning group.  For the goal of neutrality, there 
is little benefit to be obtained by restricting these petitioning 
activities; however, the restrictions would be a huge loss to 
democratic goals. 
The potential of cameras in the courtroom sometimes 
provokes the response that their presence will impact judicial 
independence.  Certainly other arguments are made as well, 
including those that it will harm witnesses or jurors, be 
inconvenient, or further sensationalize the more emotional cases.  
Focus on only the judicial independence argument demonstrates 
that it can provide little support for those opposing cameras in the 
court.  The camera reveals courtroom conduct.  It rarely shows 
results, but when it does, the revelation of the result is hardly more 
than would be apparent on the evening news or the morning 
paper.  However, for the truly interested citizen, the camera will 
show how the system and its participants actually worked—or did 
not work.  If we accept the principle that an informed citizenry is 
important to our democracy, then cameras in the courtroom are 
significant in achieving this important goal.91  The quality of our 
judicial procedures is important and there is no better way—or 
perhaps, no other way—to display it to the public than cameras in 
the courtroom. 
 
the League attempts to “influence policy through advocacy” in a nonpartisan 
manner and noting that its basic purpose is to “make democracy work for all 
citizens,” thereby suggesting that a predetermined outcome is not the ultimate 
goal). 
 90. See, e.g., MADD, Mission Statement, http://www.madd.org/about-us
/mission/ (last visited Jan. 20, 2011) (“The mission of Mothers Against Drunk 
Driving is to stop drunk driving, support the victims of this violent crime and 
prevent underage drinking.”). 
 91. See Steven Brill, Courtroom Cameras, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1181, 1192 
(1997). 
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IV. THE PRACTICAL LIMITS ON THE CONCEPTS OF JUDICIAL 
INDEPENDENCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY HAVE A BEARING 
ON OTHER CONTEMPORARY ISSUES 
The very notion of judicial neutrality is far from 
straightforward.  The image that a judge comes to an individual 
case without a pre-formed opinion is strikingly naïve.  Any judge 
who had a prior opportunity to hear a similar matter has certainly 
formed opinions about issues such as abortion, the general rate of 
incarceration, and many other similar issues.  Judges are exposed 
daily to opinions on issues from television, newspapers, law review 
articles, and friends.92  To pretend that judges or potential judges 
are neutral on these kinds of issues, so that judicial independence 
must be adjusted to protect this presumed neutrality, is to distort 
the need for and importance of the principle of judicial 
independence. 
The days when one could argue that the process of judging 
was to apply clear law to apparent and undisputed facts are long 
gone.93  With regard to the law, we know that on the appellate levels 
there are often majority and dissenting opinions.  The judges 
disagree on what the law is or ought to be.  We often are able to 
identify liberal and conservative judges who bring a pre-formed 
political view to the process, resulting in different judgments on 
individual cases.  In the continuing litigation over the 
constitutionality of the recent healthcare legislation, public 
comment notes that two federal district court judges appointed by 
Democrats have held the law constitutional while two appointed by 
Republicans have held it unconstitutional.94  It should be no 
surprise that presidents and governors often appoint persons of 
their own party to important judicial positions.95  These politicians 
know that the political views of their appointees are likely to 
influence their decisions in important cases.96  Interest groups, 
political groups, and ethnic groups all strive mightily to have 
persons of like minds or backgrounds appointed to the courts.  
They know that decisions from members of their group are likely to 
 
 92. Russell, supra note 15, at 12 (noting the various influences that constantly 
impact a judge, including legal scholars and colleagues, and the fact that they 
cannot all be avoided). 
 93. See Abraham, supra note 5, at 33–34; Cappelletti, supra note 17, at 572–73. 
 94. Dead or Alive, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 5, 2011, at 37.  
 95. See Russell, supra note 15, at 16. 
 96. BONNEAU & HALL, supra note 9, at 14. 
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reflect the group’s interest and values.  Savvy lawyers, when given 
the opportunity to choose or remove a judge, will identify judges 
who side with the prosecution, the criminal defendant, the injured 
plaintiff, or the corporate defendant, and act accordingly. 
Disputed facts are also not subject to one neutral 
interpretation.  Even where a judge has not formed a settled 
judgment on a matter of policy, the judge’s background will 
influence each factual decision.  While we have many shared 
influences with different social, ethnic, religious and education 
backgrounds, we also have different influences that will impact our 
judgments about particular litigants and fact situations.97  In many 
cases there is not a single neutral factual outcome on which we can 
all agree.  The law has developed a nearly universal principle of 
appellate review that recognizes this phenomenon: we review a trial 
judge’s findings of fact to determine whether they are clearly 
erroneous.98  In other words, we recognize that there is a range of 
outcomes in a contested case dependent on which witness is 
believed or which piece of evidence is given the most emphasis.  
Our backgrounds, and at times our ideology, will influence these 
choices. 
This does not mean the goal of neutrality is unimportant.  The 
goal is worthwhile because there is a need for litigants to have 
confidence in our dispute resolution system.  Most judges will strive 
to be impartial and render fair and neutral decisions.  We must 
judges making purely political judgments or fact-finding based on 
personal bias.  The goal of neutrality keeps our system viable as one 
that is generally perceived to reach fair results.  It is no surprise 
that among all of our institutions, the courts have historically been 
regarded by the public as having the greatest credibility.  A goal 
that is ultimately unattainable is still worth pursuing for the good it 
achieves.  Nevertheless, in evaluating the need for judicial 
independence we should not assume that providing all of the 
available protections will result in either non-political lawmaking or 
unbiased fact-finding.  We are likely to need mechanisms that 
restrain both lawmaking and biased fact-finding even if those 




 97. Id. at 2. 
 98. FREER, supra note 40, at 806–07; James Zagel & Adam Winkler, The 
Independence of Judges, 46 MERCER L. REV. 795, 804–05 (1995). 
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A corollary to this point is the fact that some judges are more 
willing or able to control personal or political inclinations than 
others.  Many judges ardently seek to repress their own views and 
treat litigants truly as equals.99  However, other judges, both at the 
trial and appellate levels, rejoice in their personal worldview and 
seek to impose it on all who come before them.  For this latter 
group, we cannot assume neutral behavior and we must have 
systems that will restrain such behavior even if it impinges on 
judicial independence. 
The fact that there are political decisions, neutral decisions, 
biased findings, fair findings, judges who strive toward neutrality, 
and others who don’t, cannot be disputed.  However, we will not 
agree on the degree of politics, bias, or neutrality operating in our 
system.  There is no way to measure these tendencies since we will 
not all agree on what constitutes a neutral decision versus a biased 
or political one.  We can move toward a rational analysis by 
recognizing that the goal of neutrality is unattainable and a system 
needs other devices to assure fair results.  A system that allowed 
complete independence would not restrain those who would fully 
exercise their own personal or political views in making decisions.  
While absolute independence is inappropriate, there is little 
consensus on the best ways to effectively constrain its negative 
effects while preserving its most important attributes—actual and 
perceived neutrality.100 
If neutrality is a goal, and difficult to define, then so is 
accountability.  What do we ask judges to be accountable for?  Who 
is to determine whether judges have achieved adequate neutrality?  
And what do we do about any conclusions?  Again, there are some 
aspects of accountability that are relatively clear and allow 
reasonable conclusions.  A judge should be accountable for a 
reasonable work effort.  Statistics should be made available from 
which that determination can be made.  Although we may differ on 
the boundaries of a reasonable effort, agreement can be expected 
on outliers.  The judicial code provides a basis to hold judges 
accountable and can reasonably result in private discipline or 
public reprimand.  Evaluations by lawyers and litigants, when 
directed at the more objective aspects of performance rather than 
 
 99. Cox, supra note 6, at 583–84. 
 100. See, e.g., Irving R. Kaufman, The Essence of Judicial Independence, 80 COLUM. 
L. REV. 671, 671–72 (1980) (opposing even modest disciplinary procedures for 
federal courts). 
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merits, provide reasonable information for accountability. 
Other aspects of the quality of a judge’s performance are 
much more difficult to measure.  The issue of “quality” in decisions 
often shades into discussions of “activism” and the politics of 
decisions.  Certainly for judges whose decisions are regularly 
reversed on appeal as contrary to law or arbitrary, it is reasonable to 
make a judgment about the quality of judicial performance.  The 
extent to which the politics of decisions should be a part of an 
accounting is far more controversial.  On the one hand, we ask 
judges as a part of a commitment to neutrality to put politics aside.  
As part of an accounting, there ought to be a way to assess whether 
a judge has lived up to that commitment.  On the other hand, we 
know that many decisions involve a political aspect.  To hold a 
judge accountable in those situations will impinge on judicial 
independence.  In a reasonable attempt to hold judges 
accountable, we should ensure that data is available on those 
aspects of performance that relate to work efforts, code 
compliance, and record on appeal.  This information provides a 
reasonable basis for an accounting without significant intrusion on 
judicial independence. 
V. DISSECTING THE DEBATE OVER ELECTIONS, 
APPOINTMENTS, AND REMOVAL OF JUDGES IN THE 
CONTEXT OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE DEMONSTRATES 
THAT MODEST ENHANCEMENTS CAN REMEDY MORE 
COMPLAINTS ABOUT ELECTIONS 
The two prominent forms of judicial selection are lifetime 
appointment with removal only by impeachment and executive 
selection with reelection to limited terms.  The federal system 
employs lifetime appointments, while most states use some form of 
appointment/election combined with limited terms.  The federal 
system clearly offers the most support for judicial independence.  
Removal is constitutionally limited to departure from “good 
Behaviour.”101  This stringent standard plus the difficulty of 
organizing a congressional impeachment proceeding have resulted 
in the impeachment of few federal judges in our nation’s history.102  
Despite occasional threats from irate congressmen, there is general 
 
 101. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 102. See ABA INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY, supra note 20, at 47–49, 67, 80–81; 
Abraham, supra note 5, at 26. 
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consensus that it is inappropriate to use impeachment to remove a 
judge because of disagreement with the judge’s decisions.103  
Historically, impeachment had little, if any, impact on judicial 
independence, but also provided no significant enhancement to 
accountability.  Lifetime appointments are favored by those who 
believe that decisions by an educated elite are an appropriate 
balance to the other two branches that are more democratically 
responsive.  Lifetime appointments clearly achieve a high level of 
judicial independence at the expense of accountability. 
Federal judges’ independence is subject to limited constraints.  
Trial judges are subject to the constraints of appeals.  Appeal 
procedures effectively impose a relatively uniform set of laws and 
court-made rules on trial courts.104  With a more limited scope of 
appeal for factual findings, trial court factual conclusions are 
subject to fewer constraints.  Appeal constraints apply less to 
appeals court judges and not at all to United States Supreme Court 
Justices.  In our federal system, additional constraints exist 
including the ethos of fair and impartial behavior, stare decisis, 
peer pressure, and public criticism.  Appointments of federal 
judges clearly reflect the politics of the current president.  
However, the confirmation proceedings are often characterized by 
a refusal to answer questions about the candidates’ position on the 
most debated political issues of the day or the surprising claim that 
the candidate has formed no opinion on that important political 
question.105 
Particularly at the Supreme Court, the politics of decisions is 
clearly apparent.  In Bush v. Gore, the Court decided a most political 
question in a very political manner.106  In Citizens United v. Federal 
Election Commission, the Supreme Court majority invalidated, on 
constitutional grounds, limitations on corporate campaign 
spending that had passed muster in a number of prior recent 
Supreme Court decisions.107  The dissent emphasized the point: 
 
 103. See Cox, supra note 6, at 574–80. 
 104. See, e.g., Bermant & Wheeler, supra note 88, at 840 (“[L]egal and 
institutional constraints . . . discourage independent judges from doing anything 
they please.”). 
 105. See Peter David, USS Kagan Prepares to Set Sail, THE ECONOMIST, July 1, 
2010, available at http://www.economist.com/node/16481611. 
 106. 531 U.S. 98 (2005) (effectively resolved the 2000 presidential election in 
favor of George W. Bush holding that manual recount to meet “safe harbor” 
deadline was unconstitutional). 
 107. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
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“The only relevant thing that has changed since Austin and 
McConnell is the composition of this Court.”108 
It is a mistake to decide whether this degree of independence 
is appropriate based on one’s ideology.  Certainly there have been 
periods, such as the Warren Court, that advanced a liberal agenda 
with decisions on desegregation and defendants’ rights.  
Conservatives railed against a liberal activist Court.  But activism is 
not the exclusive purview of the liberals.  In the mid-1930s, 
conservatives on the Supreme Court sidetracked much of the early 
New Deal legislation on constitutional analysis that seems weak in 
retrospect.109  Today, a more conservative Court regularly prompts 
claims of conservative lawmaking from liberal politicians and the 
press.110  The Court has at times stood in the way of progressive 
positions that are now widely accepted.  On other occasions, it has 
been the one branch of government that moved us toward 
progressive results, some of which are widely accepted today, while 
others continue to spark controversy.111 
Whatever your view of lifetime tenure and its significance for 
judicial activism, there is no likelihood of these constitutional 
provisions changing.  To constrain activism and restrict naked 
political judgments, there are reasonable, but modest, steps to take.  
First, we must continue to expect our federal judges to have 
neutrality and impartiality as a goal.  This is a reasonable 
expectation for which all judges should be held accountable.112  
While recognizing that precedent must bend with changing times, 
we should emphasize that stare decisis has great value because it 
permits reasonable expectations of what the law will be.113  It 
promotes the important perception that there is a neutrality to the 





 108. Id. at 942 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 109. See, e.g., R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Alton Ry. Co., 295 U.S. 330 (1935) (applying a 
narrow view of the Interstate Commerce Clause). 
 110. See, e.g., David, supra note 105, at 1; Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Obama Blasts High 
Court Ruling, N.Y. TIMES DIG., Jan. 24, 2010, at 3; Editorial, The Court’s Aggressive 
Term, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/05
/opinion/05mon1.html. 
 111. Cox, supra note 6, at 581–83. 
 112. Id. at 566. 
 113. Simon, supra note 30, at 546.   
 114. See id. at 546–47. 
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Third, we ought to accept and encourage public criticism of 
decisions.  We should encourage public interest and involvement in 
the judicial system, including courtroom monitoring programs.  It 
is healthy for citizens in a democracy to be involved, and it is 
healthy for public officials, state or federal, to hear the views of 
citizens.115  Most of us are constrained by criticism and prompted to 
better performance by oversight.  With lifetime appointments, 
federal judges are only modestly subject to public opinion.  The 
criticism by the public vindicates a democratic right, lets a judge 
know what the public believes, and may influence a judge to make 
decisions that more accurately reflect the public view.  Finally, 
federal judges should be evaluated by litigants and lawyers who 
appear before them, and the results should be made public.  Non-
public evaluations provide some education to federal judges, but 
they are easily ignored.  Public evaluations serve an educational 
purpose and provide a minimal degree of accountability for the 
quality of the work done.116 
Most of our states’ systems provide for the selection of judges 
by the governor, often with the assistance of a commission 
responsible for reviewing and recommending candidates.117  To 
promote accountability, most of the states have followed the lead of 
California in establishing judicial commissions with some authority 
to censure or remove judges for violation of rules of judicial 
conduct but not for the merits of decisions.118  These bodies seem 
to function best when jointly controlled by all branches of 
government, with strong citizen involvement.119  State judicial terms 
of office are generally quite long: six years or more, with renewal by 
some form of election.120  Elections are favored by those who 
emphasize that judges should be responsible and accountable to 
citizens.  Those who emphasize judicial independence or mistrust 
the election process seek to eliminate or restrict elections.  
Whether elections overly impinge on judicial independence or 
 
 115. Shetreet, supra note 1, at 657–58.  
 116. The system for disciplining federal judges is limited and controlled within 
the judicial system.  Bermant & Wheeler, supra note 88, at 840–41. 
 117. See, e.g., MINN. CONST. art. VI, § 8; MINN. STAT. §§ 480B.01(1)–(2) (2009); 
McKay & Parkison, supra note 42, at 360. 
 118. Cappelletti, supra note 17, at 568–69; Carrington & Cramton, supra note 
3, at 1108 (“Since 1980, 336 state court judges have been removed . . . .”); see also 
McKay & Parkison, supra note 42, at 368. 
 119. Cappelletti, supra note 17, at 568–69. 
 120. See, e.g., MINN. CONST. art. VI, § 7. 
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adequately promote either responsibility or responsiveness is 
debatable, but methods exist to make elections more successful and 
less threatening to judicial independence.  A successful judicial 
election is best described as one with a high level of voter 
participation by knowledgeable voters. 
In evaluating the role of elections in judicial retention, the 
alternatives need to be considered.  First, we have the federal 
pattern of lifetime appointments, which few states have chosen to 
follow.121  Another option is review by a commission composed of 
other judges, members of the legislature, executive appointees, 
members of the public, or a combination of all groups.  Such 
groups can be expected to bring more information and experience 
to the judicial decision.  However, they expose judges to the need 
to please the reappointing authority, and to that extent, may 
interfere with judicial independence.122  Such groups can be subject 
to bureaucratic tendencies and inbreeding so that the public 
interest is ignored while the interest of the participants is 
promoted.123  In the early years after independence, states 
experimented with commissions for the appointment and 
retention of judges.  By the 1830s, states were moving away from 
these commissions and toward elections because of negative 
reactions to the degree of influence commissions were asserting 
and the belief that judges were making important public policy 
decisions that should be subject to public review.124 
Today, state elections procedures are being criticized on 
several grounds, and some states have moved to limit judicial 
elections by adopting non-partisan elections, retention elections, or 
a format combined with commission review.125  Whatever the merits 
of retention elections versus lifetime appointment, the current 
reform efforts do not directly deal with the problems associated 
with elections.  Our society widely subscribes to the view that 
democratic elections are the best means to guarantee a long-term 
 
 121. See Bermant & Wheeler, supra note 88, at 860.  Not surprisingly, there is 
no evidence that judicial independence in federal courts has been weakened by 
any recent criticism. 
 122. Russell, supra note 15, at 16. 
 123. See BONNEAU & HALL, supra note 9, at 5. 
 124. See id. at 138; John Schwartz, Efforts Begun to End Voting for Judges, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 24, 2009, at A12, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/24/us
/24judges.html?_r=1. 
 125. BONNEAU & HALL, supra note 9, at 1, 3; Canes-Wrone & Clark, supra note 
13, at 24. 
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stable government responsible to its citizens.126  While accepting 
this theory, some judges and lawyers argue that judicial elections 
should be eliminated or restricted to preserve judicial 
independence.127  The case for this is not supported by data—
because, again, we cannot quantify either independence or neutral 
decisions.  The case is made on the basis of theory, and we can 
examine those theories to determine if they support the restrictions 
on elections or whether alternatives will better eliminate the basis 
for criticism. 
First, critics of elections point out that in some states huge 
amounts of money are being contributed to incumbents or 
challengers to influence judicial decisions.  This will obviously 
harm judicial independence.  Attempts to limit contributions to 
candidates have been blocked by the United States Supreme 
Court,128 so we must limit or eliminate elections, critics argue.  
Rather than eliminating elections, we should focus on limiting the 
impact of funds.  Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., starts us 
down this road in holding that a judge who receives a huge 
contribution from a party violates the due process clause by 
participating in a case involving that party.129  If states adopted and 
enforced a clear version of the ABA Model Judicial Rule, a litigant 
or lawyer who gave a judge more than a de minimis contribution 
could not have his case heard by that judge.130  A judge who 
accepted money from a group advocating a single position should 
not determine a case involving that particular position.  The judge 
receiving the contribution would have to recuse herself.  This rule 
preserves the democratic right to make campaign contributions but 
eliminates the attempt to undermine judicial independence or buy 
a judicial decision.  We avoid the obvious conflict of interest by a 
judge who has received money from a litigant, and we are likely to 
reduce the negative impact of huge contributions in judicial 
elections.  There is no need to eliminate elections to solve the 
 
 126. BONNEAU & HALL, supra note 9, at 1–2, 128. 
 127. Id. at 1; James Walsh, First Court Shoots Down Rules on State Judges, STAR 
TRIB. (Minneapolis), July 30, 2010, at A1–A12 (“[T]he ruling should prompt 
Minnesota to drop its system of electing judges.”). 
 128. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
 129. 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2267 (2009) (discussing how a three million dollar 
contribution triggered due process and making it clear that states are able to enact 
more stringent restrictions); Wersal v. Sexton, 613 F.3d 821 (8th Cir. 2010) 
(invalidating restrictions on judicial fundraising and suggesting that the better 
answer is tighter recusal standards). 
 130. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 2.11A(4) (2010). 
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problem of campaign contributions impinging on judicial 
independence. 
Second, critics complain that elections cause judges to 
announce their decisions, precluding them from making 
independent decisions when the issue actually arises before them.131  
There are two reasons why this argument is incorrect.  First, it 
assumes that most judges have not committed to a position on the 
serious current issues.  In fact, most incumbent judges, on issues 
within their typical jurisdiction, will have committed to a position 
by prior decisions.  On the issues of interest to typical voters, nearly 
all thoughtful lawyers, the type we would like to see as judges, have 
formed opinions on these subjects well before an election.132  These 
opinions will determine, or at the least, influence their decisions if 
they are elected, regardless of whether they announce their view in 
the election.  Second, it is better that a judge announce a view 
actually held so that voters can base their vote on an evaluation of a 
policy position which will impact future judicial decisions.  It is 
better for the litigant to know the judge’s view than to be 
blindsided by a secretly held position.  Judges who have previously 
decided an issue do not recuse themselves on the next similar case.  
Judges who have a fixed, but unannounced, view of a matter do not 
recuse themselves if a similar matter is presented by a new case.  “A 
judge’s lack of predisposition regarding the relevant legal issues in 
a case has never been thought a necessary component of equal 
justice . . . .”133  The fact that the judge has candidly disclosed a 
general position on issues in an election should not greatly impact 
independence because it is simply disclosure of the judge’s long-
developed opinion.  Disclosure should enhance the election or 
selection process.134 
While Republican Party v. White only permitted judicial 
candidates to state their views, the logic of the decision applies 
equally to candidates for judicial appointments.  The fact that a 
state, or the federal government for that matter, has an election or 
 
 131. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002) (in a 5-4 opinion 
discussing a judge’s ability to discuss politics, the Court held Minnesota’s 
requirement which disallowed discussion of political issues to be 
unconstitutional). 
 132. Id. at 776–77. 
 133. Id. at 777. 
 134. The White rationale, to the extent it is based on whether a state has 
judicial elections, is not particularly convincing.  The right of freedom of speech 
does not depend on whether there is an election. 
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appointment system does not change the First Amendment right of 
the candidate to speak.  The policy reasons supporting judicial 
accountability apply to appointed as well as elected judges.  The 
minimal intrusion on judicial independence from a candidate 
disclosing a previously held position does not support a candidate’s 
refusal to disclose these views.  It is reasonable to expect candidates 
seeking any judicial position to disclose their views on the major 
judicial issues of the day. 
Critics of elections claim that voters are ignorant of the 
qualifications of judicial candidates and will not make informed 
choices in the election.135  Unless we are to eliminate elections 
altogether, the reasonable approach to this problem is to provide 
the public with pertinent information.  There are two categories of 
information that would be helpful.  First, for incumbents, there is 
much performance information that should be available, including 
workload data, appeals results, removal frequency, and evaluation 
results.  Making this data public before an election will give 
potential candidates an opportunity to determine whether an 
incumbent judge is susceptible to challenge on the basis of 
performance.  It will give the public pertinent information to 
determine whether an incumbent merits reelection.  Second, the 
public should have information on the judicial candidates’ views on 
major social or political issues that are likely to come before the 
court.  That is not to say a candidate should discuss his decision in 
a future case, because that discussion should await the full 
development of facts in the case.  But, for example, in a race for a 
seat on a court that has general criminal jurisdiction, the public 
should be able to tell whether the candidates believe the current 
rate of incarceration is too high or too low.  The judicial election 
process can be much improved. Providing the public with 
substantial information about performance and positions will allow 
citizens a meaningful basis on which to cast a vote. 
Finally, critics of elections complain that judicial races lack 
visibility so that voters do not learn enough about candidates to 
make informed choices.136  However, when judicial races do 
become highly visible, these same critics complain that the 
increased profile results in politics and money damaging the 
judicial system.  The negative impact of money can be largely 
 
 135. See BONNEAU & HALL, supra note 9, at 1–2. 
 136. Id. at 3. 
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limited by requiring judges to recuse themselves from disputes 
involving contributors.  The solution to low visibility is not to 
further decrease visibility, but to provide sufficient information so 
that the issues become visible.  The movement from partisan to 
non-partisan to retention elections tends to reduce participation by 
voters rather than focus attention on the races.137  The absence of 
meaningful information about incumbent judges and challengers 
leads to lack of interest.  In our present elections, even the most 
diligent voter will have difficulty finding a reasonable basis on 
which to differentiate candidates.  The expectation that voters have 
a reasonable basis for a decision requires that the judicial system 
make available the information needed to make those reasonable 
decisions. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
The essential elements of our federal and state systems for 
selecting and retaining judges are unlikely to change soon.  The 
federal system of presidential appointments with life tenure 
provides strong support for judicial independence but provides 
relatively little support for public accountability or responsiveness.  
The state systems with appointed judges subject to some form of 
retention election are criticized where the election process is 
imperfect and some of the ancillary aspects of elections interfere 
with judicial independence.  Both systems, lifetime appointment 
and elections, have flaws.  While the ultimate goals of democratic 
accountability and judicial independence are ideals that will never 
be perfectly achieved, we can, within the structures of our present 
systems, improve our quest to reach these conflicting goals. 
Most important is that the ethos of neutral application of the 
law be preserved.  Appointing and confirming authorities should 
continue to state this as a primary requirement of appointment.  
Rules of judicial conduct should continue to emphasize this goal.  
We should move beyond this general rhetoric, however.  In the 
federal system, the requirements should be clear that a judge with 
any financial interest in a matter, other than one in common with 
all citizens, should not be the judge of the matter.  The same rule 
should apply to state judges with the specific additional 
requirement that a judge receiving more than a de minimis 
campaign contribution from a party, lawyer, or single interest 
 
 137. Id. at 138. 
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group should not judge a matter involving the contributor.  If we 
truly prize the goal of judicial independence, we will enact and 
enforce specific provisions to limit the impact of financial interests 
on judicial decisions. 
In the federal system that emphasizes independence over 
accountability, we should take modest steps to promote 
accountability.  First, we should encourage vigorous public 
discussion, including criticism, of judicial decisions.  Criticism 
should not be stifled by claims that it interferes with judicial 
independence.  The democratic goals of public debate and 
accountability surely trump any incidental impact on judicial 
independence.  Second, the judicial system ought to make available 
full performance data, including evaluation data, so there is a 
measure of accountability even for a judge with life tenure.  Finally, 
candidates for judicial positions should disclose their views on 
important judicial issues so that appointing authorities can make 
more informed decisions. 
In our state systems, the presence of some form of election 
makes it even more important that information on judicial 
performance be made available so that the voters have a basis to 
cast informed votes.  State-sponsored judicial monitoring groups 
appear to perform a valuable function.  Generally, their review of 
complaints involving judges’ compliance with rules of judicial 
conduct enforces accountability without infringing judicial 
independence.  Encouraging candidates to disclose their views on 
subjects where they obviously have a view will avoid the 
disingenuous claim that judges do not have views on the more 
serious issues of the day.  Eliminating the impact of financial 
interest and campaign contributions on individual cases will 
remove an obvious impropriety and enhance the public perception 
that judges will be fair and impartial. 
The subject of judicial independence and accountability is 
extremely important in a democratic society.  It is a complex 
subject but one which cries out for better understanding.  While 
the judiciary has much to say about this subject, it should not have 
the final say.  Judges have self-interest in the outcome.  Many 
judges may prefer lifetime appointments to elections, oppose 
public evaluation, or resist making performance data available.  
Elections, evaluations, and court monitoring may make some 
judges uncomfortable, and we may hear a claim of interference 
with judicial independence.  But whether or not these proposals 
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are appropriate should be settled by the public through elected 
representatives who can determine the appropriate provisions to 
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